

PLACEMENT OF ROMANIAN AND BULGARIAN EMBASSIES: EU ASPIRATIONS AND COMMUNIST LEGACY

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Abstract

Romania and Bulgaria have some undeniable political and social similarities and one would also expect some similarities in their foreign policies. Both countries will soon join the EU, were governed by Communist regimes for decades, and have majority Orthodox Christian populations. In this analysis, the authors investigate the logic by which Romania and Bulgaria locate their embassies abroad. The findings of logistical regressions on the placement of embassies for 168 countries in the world illustrate that Romania and Bulgaria locate their embassies on a very different basis. While Bulgaria tends to favor countries with a Communist legacy, powerful countries, and countries with large Orthodox populations, Romania tends merely to favor EU member states and powerful countries.

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Introduction

The state's decision to invest in embassies is a dichotomous decision to invest in relationships with other states. Embassies are political representations that symbolize the willingness of states to put resources into developing relationships with other countries. Few countries have the resources to invest in embassies in all the countries of the world. Thus, most countries are forced into a situation in which they are compelled to make choices about which states will be rewarded with embassies. But what are the patterns by which a state can make the economic investment in relationships with other countries? Such patterns should reveal something about the ability of the state to invest in relationships to attain goals and the cultural affinities of those in power in the state.

Bulgaria and Romania are two aspiring members of the European Union (EU), with similar experiences under Communist dictatorships. In this analysis, we will investigate whether Bulgaria and Romania, indeed, invest their resources into developing relationships with EU member states, an investment consistent with a desire to be politically and socially part of Europe, or if they are saddled with a Communist legacy which serves as an impediment to goal-oriented investment in diplomatic representations abroad. We will also investigate what other considerations seem to play a role in the location of embassies abroad for both of these countries.

Both Romania and Bulgaria have a great deal to gain from being in the EU and have made explicit statements regarding the need to enter the EU. According to Bulgaria's President, Georgi Parvanov (2002) "...the strategic goal of full membership of the European and Euro-Atlantic organizations calls for a further widening and deepening of our bilateral relations with the other European states". One way to achieve this goal is through establishing embassies in all member states of the European Union in order to facilitate bilateral cooperation with EU countries and the European integration of Bulgaria. The president also points out that "...there is hardly a state in the world that can ignore Moscow in planning and conducting its foreign policy ... There is hardly any serious politician who fails to recognize that country's potential and take into account its interests, including those in south-eastern Europe." This orientation towards close ties with Moscow is logical considering the historical bonds between Bulgaria and Russia, their communist heritage and cultural and Orthodox links.

Accession to the EU is also a strategic goal for Romania: the country gives priority to consolidation of relations with EU member states and the USA; the development of economic, technical, scientific and cultural cooperation with China, the western Balkan area, Central Asia, Middle East and Latin America countries; the consolidation and extension of relations with the Vatican, Israel and Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania 2006). Special emphasis is laid on the development of "... relations of good neighborhood and regional cooperation within the south-eastern

European and Black Sea countries” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania 2006). This signals a more global view for Romania than for Bulgaria, which suggests also more embassies throughout the world than its southern neighbor. However, it also suggests that Romania views itself as a regional player in the Balkans.

Both of these neighboring countries share many of the same characteristics and thus we should expect some similarities in foreign policy. First, we would expect that since both states have attaining membership in the EU as a top priority, they would seek to invest in embassies in those countries in the EU. This should be the case since the EU is an economic and political union. As such, having institutionalized political representation in other EU countries would promote political communication between the host and the country aspiring to be in the EU. Secondly, we would expect that the Communist legacy of the countries has saddled the countries with commitments with other countries for historical reasons. We would expect that the legacy of Communism will result in holding on to embassies in those countries with a Communist legacy since embassies may have become embedded in countries during the Communist era and uprooting such embassies will mean overcoming significant bureaucratic inertia.

Previous Works

Although there is substantial research on Bulgarian and Romanian affairs, much of this research does not scientifically test hypotheses regarding foreign policy. Instead, much of the work deals with the normative issues of Bulgaria and Romania joining the EU or the positive or negative impacts that joining the EU will have on the respective countries (see for example; Bojkov 2004, Lefebvre 1994, Light and Phinmore 1991, Melescanu 1996, Pantev *et al.* 1995, Pantev *et al.* 1996, Pantev 2005, Popova 1997, Pisacaru, 1996). Thus, much of the previous research on Bulgaria and Romania does not help in terms of leading the way in an empirical analysis of the distribution of embassies, except to suggest the proper independent variables to begin the analysis.

What emerges from the literature about the politics and foreign policies of Romania and Bulgaria is the importance of EU membership for both Romania and Bulgaria, since the literature repeatedly refers to the importance of, and problems associated with, joining the EU. However, what also emerges from the literature is the shadow of the Communist past for both Romania and Bulgaria. The literature repeatedly comments upon the specter of Communist dictatorships and the role that such a past has on the present political culture.

There is also very little to be gleaned from the more general literature to model the placement of embassies. The only known quantitative analysis on the subject is a series of articles by Webster (2001a, 2001b, 2001c) who investigated the placement of embassies for several countries. In these analyses, Webster modeled the probabil-

ity of placement of embassies and looked into the power considerations, cultural affinities, regional aspects, and IGOs that lead to influencing how countries place their embassies. The findings of all the research illustrate that countries place embassies in powerful states, supporting the notion that states recognize the need to have clear communication channels in countries with the ability to influence the international system. However, there is also significant evidence that cultural influences play a role in the placement of embassies.

The most global work of Webster (2001b) is an investigation to determine whether Commonwealth membership influences states to interact bilaterally by reciprocating embassies. The dependent variable for the analysis for this particular work was the presence or absence of an embassy. The major hypothesis tested was that Commonwealth members would favor other Commonwealth members since they have certain commonalities both historically and culturally. The embassy placements of Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Cyprus, and Kenya were investigated. In the investigation, control variables were used to determine whether alternative explanations played a role—power of the host country (measured in logged GNP) or region of the host country. Using only three indicators to show the five Commonwealth countries and their values for the host country, the models predict between 74-87 percent of the variations of the embassies abroad. In each of the five regressions, the measure of power (logged GNP) is the most powerful explanatory power and is statistically significant for regressions on each country. The regional variable meets with success in the regressions for most of the countries, suggesting that Bangladesh, Canada, Cyprus, and Kenya all favor their geopolitical regions. However, the main explanatory variable of interest in the analysis fails miserably, with only the regression for Kenya suggesting that Commonwealth nations are favored as hosts of embassies abroad. The major finding, then, from this work is that countries largely distribute their embassies on the basis of power and region.

Webster (2001c) investigated more thoroughly the location of embassies and high commissions by Canada. In this work, Webster takes five independent variables into account to determine which ones play a role in the location of embassies and high commissions abroad. In the model used, Webster measures power (logged GNP of the host country), NATO membership, a dummy variable to denote the USA, and membership in the Francophone area and Commonwealth. The model used properly predicts 75 percent of the placements of embassies abroad, while merely guessing that a country had a Canadian embassy would only have predicted 53 percent of the placements correctly. What is notable in the findings is that only the independent variable denoting power and Francophone membership showed any predictive power. The findings suggest that Canada places its embassies on the basis of whether the host countries are powerful or not and whether the country is a Francophone member. The implications of the research are that power matters for the Canadian state's embassy

placement, as does the regional component. However, internal considerations for the Francophone minority in Canada also seem to play a role in the placement of embassies abroad for Canada.

Of the work that is most relevant to the question of Bulgaria and Romania, it seems that the research on Cyprus (Webster 2001a) gives the most insight, since during the time of the investigation it was seeking EU membership and a high proportion of its population is Christian Orthodox, making it more similar to Bulgaria and Romania than the other countries investigated in Webster's work. Webster (2001a), as in his other works, took the power of the host country and a regional component into account in this research. In addition, Webster took Orthodoxy, Commonwealth membership, and EU member states into account to determine whether the Cypriot state considered cultural links (Orthodoxy) as a component influencing the placement of embassies. The resulting model predicted correctly 87 percent of the embassy placements abroad for Cyprus. Webster found that Cyprus placed its embassies consistently with its goal to join in the EU, in states that were already EU members. Thus, Webster argued, the Cypriot state used its resources to integrate itself politically into the EU's community of nations. However, there is also considerable evidence that Cyprus locates embassies in the most powerful countries in the world, in countries with significant Orthodox populations, and in countries in the Middle East region. The model showed that as in the other research (Webster 2001b), there is no evidence that Cyprus favors other Commonwealth countries.

The research by Webster leads the way in terms of determining which factors should be taken into account when modeling the placement of embassies. Firstly, the research illustrates that states are very sensitive to the question of power and thus place embassies in countries that are powerful. Secondly, the research shows that there are significant geopolitical considerations, in that the importance of a country is also partly influenced by whether the country is in the same region or not. Further, the research illustrates that there are cultural aspects that seem to influence the placement of embassies for some countries. Finally, there is also significant evidence that the placement of embassies is influenced by the desire to join the EU, as shown in the research on Cyprus.

In this investigation, the authors will analyze the placement of embassies by looking into realist considerations, since all previous research on the topic has shown that powerful countries are the key countries to be rewarded with embassies. In addition, we will also look into geopolitical considerations, since geopolitics has consistently shown success in empirical research on embassy placement. In addition, the question of cultural likeness or arguably "civilizations" will be considered, since an Orthodoxy variable has met with success in the research on the country most similar to Romania and Bulgaria in previous research, Cyprus. However, the question of the EU and a Communist legacy will also be modeled into the investigation. The EU mem-

bership question was of key importance for the country most similar to those under investigation and the Communist legacy is an important historical aspect to take into account to explain current variations in embassy placement.

Data and Indicators

The dependent variable for this analysis is the existence of a Romanian or Bulgarian embassy in a country, a dichotomous variable to indicate presence or non-presence of an embassy in the countries of the world. Those countries with a Romanian or Bulgarian embassy are coded with a “1” to denote presence of an embassy in the country while those without an embassy are coded with a “0” for the year 2006. The sources of the information are official Romanian and Bulgarian Foreign Ministry websites. Romania has more embassies abroad than does Bulgaria. Bulgaria has 73 embassies abroad, while Romania has 85, for those countries in the analysis¹. The listings of the embassies of the respective countries are supplied in the appendices of this paper. Arguably, the presence of an embassy signals that the relationship with the host country is valued more so than the relationship with a country which does not host an embassy.

There are broad categories for which we can consider explanatory variables for the analysis. The literature has highlighted the importance of power and proximity. Thus, for the analysis, the power of the host country and location of the host country should be taken into account. However, culture and its related concept of “civilizations” can also be taken into account on the basis that “birds of a feather flock together,” indeed, cultural, linguistic, and social linkages between states probably impact upon perceptions of the value of other states. In addition, the concept of integration into a community of countries can be taken into account in the analysis.

The major independent variables of interest in this analysis are EU member states and those states with a Communist past, indicating the integration or use of political resources to integrate the country into an integrated community of countries. Table One below summarizes all the independent variables in the analysis, including the two major independent variables of interest. In terms of classifying the EU member states, the data include all of the EU member states following the 2003 enlargement and they are denoted with a dummy variable. Thus, countries such as Cyprus, Slovakia, and Malta are denoted as EU member states, as are the others. The expectation is that countries will systematically locate embassies in EU countries in order to facilitate their aspirations of membership in the EU.

1. Some countries were removed from the analysis due to the non-availability of GDP data.

Table 1. Concepts, Operationalization, and Hypothesized Relationships

Concept	Measure	Hypothesized Relationship with Dependent Variable
Power	GDP	Positive
EU Member	EU member (dummy variable)	Positive
Communist Legacy	Communist country or former Communist country (dummy variable)	Positive
Balkan states	Balkan state (dummy variable)	Positive
Orthodoxy	Percent Christian Orthodox (ratio level)	Positive

In addition, those states with a Communist legacy are denoted with a dummy variable. These states are those that were part of the Soviet Union and their clients, as well as other states that either previously or currently have Communist regimes (China, and Vietnam, among others). Germany remained a curious case in the data, since part of it was under a Communist government for many years. However, since the majority of the population and area was never under Communist control, Germany was not denoted as having been a Communist country. We expect that a Communist legacy will show an influence in the location of embassies since many of the embassies are relics of previous political alignments. Thus we expect that the Communist legacy will leave traces imbedded in the foreign policy establishments of the Romanian and Bulgarian states.

There are important control variables in the analysis. Most importantly, there is the notion that states allocate resources based upon the power of states. The notion is that it is important for states to have representations in countries with a significant ability to influence policy internationally. Power is measured by GDP in 2003, as reported in the UNDP World Development Report for 2005. Others have used the size of the economy to measure power internationally and it is highly correlated with alternative indices to measure the same concept (see Organski and Kugler 1981).

Unsurprisingly, some microstates and states with economies that are hard to quantify are excluded from the analysis due to missing data. For example, Afghanistan, Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, Somalia, San Marino, Tuvalu, Monaco, Micronesia and Liechtenstein are removed from the analysis due to missing data, among others. The country of Serbia and Montenegro was problematic, so some pains were taken to keep the country in the analysis, despite the absence of entirely comparable data,

since it is an important Balkan country neighboring both of the key countries in this analysis. Thus, CIA World Fact Book data for 2005 were used to arrive at an estimate of the size of the economy of Serbia and Montenegro, in order to keep it in the analysis. Using this measure, the most powerful countries in descending order are the United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and China. The GDP measures probably mirror well the notion of which countries are the most powerful in the international system and incidentally include four of the five members of the UN's Security Council among the largest seven economies in the world. We expect that states locate embassies based upon power, ensuring that their state interests and communications are supported through diplomatic representations in powerful countries.

The other important control variable is the regional variable, indicating which states are located on the Balkan Peninsula. Such a variable was added to the analysis since it could be argued that the states on the peninsula have common issues and thus need embassies in each others' countries in order to assist in communications between states as well as to deal with common problems at the sub-state level. Thus, those countries on the peninsula were denoted with a dummy variable. The expectation is that countries in the Balkans will be systematically favored in terms of location of embassies, since Romania and Bulgaria are on the Balkan Peninsula.

The final important control variable in the analysis is the question of cultures and its related concept of "civilizations," in order to take the commonality of cultures into account. Indeed, taking cultural forces into account is important, and to some, such as Mazrui (1990), a critical thing to take into account in such an analysis. Huntington (1997) identifies an Orthodox civilization in which there are certain commonalities among the peoples and both Bulgaria and Romania are identified as part of this civilization. One of the defining characteristics of the Orthodox civilization is the religious character of the people. Thus, all the countries of the world were measured as to how Orthodox they are at the ratio level. The data come from the CIA's World Fact Book but some adjustments had to be made to the data since the adherence to Orthodoxy was not uniformly reported. If no Orthodox population was indicated in the report for the country, it was assumed that the population contained no Orthodox Christians, and thus was denoted with a zero. In addition, Russia had to be assumed to be as Orthodox as Ukraine and Coptic Christians were classified as Orthodox Christians, for the purpose of this analysis. Of the 168 countries in the analysis, 152 of them have zero to denote that there is no significant Orthodox Christian population in the country. We expect that the greater percentage of Orthodox Christian adherents in a country, the more likely the country is to host a Romanian or Bulgarian embassy.

Data Analysis

With the five independent variables in the analysis, there is some reason that there would be a problem with multicollinearity in the data. Thus, before performing sta-

tistical tests to determine the attributes linked with the placement of embassies, correlations were performed with the independent variables in the analysis. The best bivariate correlation between the independent variables for the two datasets is the link between Orthodoxy and a Communist legacy. However, the relationship between Orthodoxy and a Communist legacy yields a Pearson bivariate correlation statistic of only .43. This is the strongest correlation among the independent variables although the correlation coefficient is far less than perfect (1) and is safely below .5. There are other correlations that show systematic relationships—the correlation between Balkan countries and a Communist legacy and the correlation between Orthodoxy and Balkan Countries—but they yield correlation coefficients that are less than .4. Despite the fact that there are correlations between some of the independent variables, multicollinearity is not a serious concern for the independent variables in this work. Since the dependent variable in this analysis is dichotomous, the appropriate technique is Logistical analysis. Using standard OLS regressions on the dependent variable would be inappropriate. Thus, regressions were run using the same independent variables to explain the variations in the placements of embassies for both Romania and Bulgaria. The output of the investigation of Bulgarian embassies is shown in Table Two below.

Table 2. Placement of Bulgarian Embassies

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
GDP	.031	.006	25.322	1	.000	1.031
Orthodoxy	.061	.031	3.869	1	.049	1.063
EU	-.745	.870	.734	1	.392	.475
Communist Legacy	2.418	.630	14.750	1	.000	11.222
Balkan states	7.051	25.104	.079	1	.779	1153.716
Constant	-2.557	.391	42.670	1	.000	.078
Nagelkerke R Square	.709					
N	168					

Table 2a. Predicted Success of Logistic Analysis

		Predicted		Percentage Correct
Observed		No	Yes	
		No	88	7
	Yes	14	59	80.8
Overall Percentage				87.5

Note: The cut value is .50

The data show that the model with five independent variables explains about 71% of the variations in the dependent variable, as shown by the pseudo R-square value. However, what is more impressive is that the model predicts correctly about 88% of the placement of the Bulgarian embassies using only these five independent variables. All in all, the model has a strong predictive value.

However, not all of the independent variables are equally successful in predicting the outcomes of the dependent variable, placement of Bulgarian embassies. For the chief variables for this analysis, it seems that there is good reason to believe that EU member states are not favored, although there is significant evidence that the Bulgarian state favors those states with a Communist legacy. The independent variable denoting the EU member states indicates that being a member state of the EU is actually negatively linked with having a Bulgarian embassy, although the significance level shows that there is little or no reason to believe that this relationship is systematic. However, for the independent variable indicating those states with a Communist legacy, there is a positive link, illustrating that Communist and post-Communist states are favored in a systematic way.

The control variables illustrate that the Bulgarian state systematically favors powerful states in the international system and states with a significant Orthodox population. However, there seems to be no evidence that the Bulgarian state favors other Balkan states. In general, the model shows us that placement of Bulgarian embassies is based upon power considerations, Communist legacy, and those states that are members of the Orthodox world.

However, does the Romanian state follow the same logic as the Bulgarian state? Table Three below illustrates that there is reason to believe that there are differences. To begin with, the model explains a fair amount of the variation in the dependent variable. For example, the pseudo R-squared statistic shows that the model explains about 72% of the variations of the location of the Romanian embassies. The location of the model also correctly predicts the existence or non-existence of Romanian embassies for about 88% of the 168 countries in the sample.

Table 3. Placement of Romanian Embassies

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
GDP	.045	.010	20.742	1	.000	1.046
Orthodoxy	.115	.081	1.987	1	.159	1.122
EU	2.239	1.198	3.491	1	.062	9.387
Communist Legacy	1.005	.676	2.213	1	.137	2.732
Balkan states	7.276	40.356	.033	1	.857	1445.798
Constant	-2.109	.345	37.312	1	.000	.121
Nagelkerke R Square	.715					
N	168					

Table 3a. Predicted Success of Logistic Analysis

Observed	Predicted		Percentage Correct
	No	Yes	
No	78	5	94.0
Yes	15	70	82.4
Overall Percentage			88.1

Note: The cut value is .50

However, not all of the independent variables are equally useful in explaining the variations in the dependent variable. The two major independent variables of interest in this piece illustrate that the Romanian state favors EU member states although there is little evidence that it favors those with a Communist legacy. The Romanian state is statistically more likely to place an embassy in an EU country than in non-EU member states, since the independent variable denoting EU members is positively linked with having a Romanian embassy systematically. However, there is little reason to believe that the Romanian state places embassies in countries with a Communist legacy in a systematic way.

In terms of the control variables, it seems that there is strong evidence that the Romanian state has placed embassies in countries that are powerful, although there is little or no evidence to suggest that placement of embassies is linked with the Orthodox civilization or being a Balkan country. There is very strong systematic evidence to illustrate that Romanian embassies follow powerful countries. In sum, it seems that the Romanian state invests in embassies in the EU and powerful countries and does not invest in embassies based upon a regional mentality, a sense of community with the Orthodox world, nor due to its Communist legacy.

Conclusion and Discussion

The findings of this analysis illustrate that the Bulgarian and Romanian states, although they have many similarities, locate embassies using a slightly different logic. There is ample evidence that Romania locates embassies strategically in order to facilitate communications with EU member states, thus building relationships in the EU. However, it does not seem that Bulgaria does the same in regards to the EU. The evidence illustrates that the Bulgarian state seems to have located embassies in those countries with a Communist legacy, in powerful states, and those with an Orthodox population. In fact, Bulgaria has taken the step of hiring consultants to lobby in Europe on behalf of its application to be an EU member (Beunderman 2006), perhaps

signaling that the current embassies are either not broadly enough spread among the EU member states or are ineffective in terms of convincing governmental leaders in the member states that Bulgaria is worthy of membership in the EU.

The differences in terms of the allocation of embassies for Bulgaria and Romania bring to the fore the question of the impact of a Communist legacy. It may well be that Romania has rethought its Communist past and has realigned its foreign policy in the post-Communist world although there is significant evidence that Bulgaria has not done the same. It appears that the Communist legacy has been a bit sticky for Bulgaria. However, there is reason to believe that there is a historical reason for the differences -Romania, even under its Communist regime, pursued a much more independent foreign policy than did Bulgaria. Therefore, it may be that the relationships shown for Romania reflect a historically independent foreign policy while those for Bulgaria are a trace of a foreign policy much more closely aligned with the Soviet Union.

In addition, it seems that the location of embassies in EU countries illustrates that Romania has invested in developing relationships with the EU. This is consistent with Romania's aim of integrating itself into the EU. However, Bulgaria's location of embassies does not seem to follow the pattern of developing relationships with the EU states. In a sense, Bulgaria's allocation of embassies is not consistent with its goal of attaining membership in the EU.

The findings are suggestive that Romania is not allocating its foreign policy resources in order to maintain a sense of community with other Orthodox Christian countries, although the same can not be said about Bulgaria. Indeed, it seems that Romania has placed its embassies in countries that are powerful and countries that are in the EU. Bulgaria, on the other hand, has invested in embassies that are in powerful countries, in Orthodox countries, and in countries that have a Communist legacy.

What is common in terms of how Romania and Bulgaria locate embassies is that they seem to show no favoring of countries in the Balkan Peninsula. This is a curious finding since it suggests that these two countries do not act as if they are regional players, when the region is perceived as being the Balkans. This is remarkable since it can be assumed that the countries in the region have many social and political issues that would benefit from the tangible presence of an embassy.

Another common feature in the cases of Romania and Bulgaria is that both favor placing embassies in powerful states in the system. Indeed, all research so far on the topic of embassy placement (Webster 2001a, Webster 2001b, Webster 2001c) has consistently supported the notion that states place their embassies in powerful states in the system. Thus, all the research on placement of embassies so far has underscored the realist concerns for power in the location of embassies. For the cases of Romania and Bulgaria, one could argue as well that embassies are seen as facilitating relationships with NATO countries. However, the correlation between NATO mem-

bership and large GDPs would be quite high, since NATO is composed of most of the largest economies and most powerful political players in the global system (US, UK, Germany, France, and Italy, among others). Thus using NATO membership as a dummy explanatory variable would largely be repetitive and highly correlated with the power indicator in use.

The prescriptive element that arises from this investigation is that it suggests that Bulgaria rethink its location of diplomatic representations. The location of embassies in countries with a Communist legacy but with few or no other links with Bulgaria suggests that the state is squandering resources. For example, having an embassy in Mongolia and many of the former member states of the Soviet Union seems to be rather wasteful, since there are few common issues that Bulgaria would have with these countries. It would be better to relocate these embassies in countries with definite strategic goals of the Bulgarian state, such as membership in the EU. Political representations in EU member states would assist in integrating Bulgaria and its population into the community of the EU.

What is interesting about the research findings is that they illustrate that culture and the linked concept of “civilizations,” as Huntington (1997) envisioned it, do play a role in the allocation of state resources. The location of Bulgarian embassies follows the logic of culture and arguably civilizations. However, there are also indications that countries have the ability to realign themselves and systematically insinuate themselves into a different civilization. It seems that Romania’s quest for EU membership follows the same path that Spain made in its conscious effort to integrate itself into the EU. Huntington (1997) notes that Spain could have chosen to be the leader of a greater Iberian civilization (comprising Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula) but instead chose to integrate itself into the EU. It may be that Romania is following the example of Spain, working to integrate itself into the EU, despite the fact that nearly 90% of its population is Christian Orthodox, suggesting that Romania should belong to the civilization of Orthodoxy and should locate its embassies accordingly.

What is notable about the research findings is that they illustrate the value of the classical rational actor approach to the study of foreign policy of countries, as defined by Allison and Zelikow (1998). While more sophisticated models of the placement of embassies may yield slightly higher predictive results, our models with only five independent variables, of which three are dummy variables, properly predicts about 88% of the placement of embassies. This highlights the strength of the rational actor approach, showing that despite a lack of knowledge of the people and organizational procedures in the making of foreign policy for Romania and Bulgaria, nearly ninety percent of the placement of embassies could be predicted using publicly available data. As a social science exercise, the model used in this analysis is successful since it is highly predictive and parsimonious. Perhaps those with greater insight into the

foreign policy establishments of Romania and Bulgaria will be able to add insight to explain the twelve percent of the embassy placements that the model does not predict or could suggest more sophisticated models.

Future work should be done to make the model more dynamic and interesting. For example, the dichotomous dependent variable misses some information since it does not discern the size of the diplomatic mission in countries. A much better indicator would be an interval-level measure of the number of employees in embassies abroad. This would give greater information regarding the level of investment in relationships between states. In addition, future models should look into ways of explaining how it is decided when to open and close embassies. The findings suggest that embassies are “sticky,” meaning when they are set up, there is resistance to closing them. It can be assumed that there are vested interests that prevent closures, since the investment in embassies results in employment and jobs with a significant amount of social status attached to them.

Further research should also look into the attitudes of political leaders in Romania and Bulgaria and their attitudes towards embassies and external linkages. The econometric findings of this analysis are suggestive of different policies and choices of political leaders in Romania and Bulgaria. It would appear that Romania has been more dynamic in realigning its location of embassies while Bulgaria seems to be in a time warp of sorts, still clinging to links with Communist and post-Communist countries. Future research should look into whether Romania actually has a more dynamic realignment of embassy placement or whether the current location analysis merely reflects a state that has historically had more links with foreign countries and a more independent foreign policy. In addition, future research should compare the placement of embassies with other new members and candidate members to the EU to determine whether there is a dynamic model that can explain embassy placement and joining the EU.

At any rate, this investigation illustrates that investments in foreign policy may not seem to be consistent with stated policy. Indeed, vested interests may prevent flexibility in realigning foreign policy. Future research should look into what vested interests and attitudes of leadership prevent realignment of locations of embassies to be in line with stated objectives of states. Different economic constraints, different paths in terms of adjusting to the situation in the post-Soviet world, and different attitudes towards foreign policy and the importance of foreign policy may come into play when deciding which states should be seen as hosts for embassies.

The major contribution of this work to the study of comparative foreign policies is that states have ways of measuring the importance of other states in the international system and locate embassies on that basis. Since power is the “currency” of international relations, it is no surprise that states place their embassies in powerful countries. There are other measures of the importance of another state and regional or

cultural considerations are not the same for all. States structure their foreign policies and links with other countries differently, although this analysis has confirmed the one rule that realists would consider paramount—that the power of other countries in the system is a universal consideration in terms of constructing a strategic foundation of embassy placement. Beyond that, states seem to exercise a great deal of flexibility in terms of structuring their strategic placement of embassies abroad and (by extension) structuring their foreign policies.

Appendix 1. Embassies of Bulgaria

Afghanistan	Germany	Poland
Albania	Ghana	Portugal
Algeria	Greece	Romania
Angola	Hungary	Russia
Argentina	India	Serbia and Montenegro
Armenia	Indonesia	Slovakia
Australia	Iran	Slovenia
Austria	Iraq	South Africa
Azerbaijan	Ireland	Spain
Belarus	Israel	Sudan
Belgium	Italy	Sweden
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Japan	Switzerland
Brazil	Jordan	Syria
Canada	Kazakhstan	Thailand
Chile	Korea	Tunisia
China	Kuwait	Turkey
Croatia	Lebanon	Ukraine
Cuba	Libya	United Arab Emirates
Czech Republic	Macedonia	United Kingdom
Cyprus	Mexico	United States of America
Denmark	Moldova	Uzbekistan
Egypt	Mongolia	Vatican
Estonia	Morocco	Venezuela
Ethiopia	Netherlands	Vietnam
Finland	Nigeria	Yemen
France	Norway	Zimbabwe
Georgia	Pakistan	

Appendix 2. Embassies of Romania

Albania	Indonesia	Qatar
Algeria	Iran	Russia
Angola	Iraq	San Marino
Argentina	Ireland	Saudi Arabia
Armenia	Israel	Serbia and Montenegro
Australia	Italy	Senegal
Austria	Japan	Singapore
Azerbaijan	Jordan	Slovakia
Belarus	Kazakhstan	Slovenia
Belgium	Kenya	South Africa
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Korea	Spain
Brazil	North Korea	Sri Lanka
Bulgaria	Kuwait	Sudan
Canada	Latvia	Sweden
Chile	Lebanon	Switzerland
China	Libya	Syria
Colombia	Lithuania	Thailand
Croatia	Luxembourg	Tunisia
Cuba	Macedonia	Turkey
Czech Republic	Malaysia	Turkmenistan
Cyprus	Malta	Ukraine
Denmark	Mexico	United Arab Emirates
Egypt	Moldova	United Kingdom
Estonia	Morocco	United States of America
Ethiopia	Netherlands	Uruguay
Finland	Nigeria	Uzbekistan
France	Norway	Vatican
Georgia	Pakistan	Venezuela
Germany	Peru	Vietnam
Greece	Philippines	Yemen
Hungary	Poland	Zimbabwe
India	Portugal	

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